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Presumed Guilty: The Pre-Trial Detainee 
by William A. Brockett, Jr. 
William Brockett graduated from Yale Law School last 
year and is now an attorney with Federal Defenders in 
San Diego. 
I know not whether Laws be right, 
Or whether Laws be wrong; 
All that we know who lie in gaol 
Is that the wall is strong; 
And that each day is like a year, 
A year whose days are long 
... The vilest deeds like poison weeds 
Bloom well in prison air; 
It is only what is good in Man 
That wastes and withers there: 
The anguish keeps the heavy gate, 
And the warder is Despair. 
-"Ballad of Reading Gaol", Oscar Wilde 
This joint is driving me nuts! 
-Harry R., pre-trial detainee, April 3, 1970 
The "New Haven Jail", as New Haven's Correctional 
Center was known in the past, was built in part in 1851. 1 
The "new" wing of the jail was floated up from Sing-
Sing in 1896 when it was declared obsolete in that insti-
tution. Legislative commissions constituted in 1932, 
1934, 1936 and 1938 decried the inadequacy of the 
facility and called for the construction of a new plant. 
But conditions in the jail have remained substantially the 
same for the last fifty years. 
1
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There are a total of 300 cells, each about 5' x 8'. 
Since there are no plumbing facilities in the cells, 
buckets are used to serve the sanitary needs of the entire 
population. A few toilets and showers exist at the end of 
each cell block and are available to inmates when the 
cells are unlocked. The furniture in each cell consists of 
an iron cot and the cell bucket. The cells are built in 
tiers of three. Each cell block has a day room connected 
to it, with benches, tables and a TV set. Most of the in-
mates crowd into these day rooms 10:30-11 :30, 
1:00-3:50 and 4:45-10:00, their only "free" time. The 
·rooms strike the outside observer as grotesque: they are 
filled with a few card-players, rows of humans of every 
description lining the walls staring sightlessly into the 
center of the room and a constant babble of voices cut 
through by the booming tones of a TV set whose un-
winking white eye is always open. 
Recreation other than card playing and TV watching 
is limited. When the weather is favorable, inmates are 
allowed into a courtyard that is surrounded on four sides 
by the Center's building. A volleyball net and sagging 
basketball hoop provide some diversion, and they are 
appreciated by the inmates for the few minutes they can 
be used. No library exists except for books that are re-
ceived from the outsid~ and passed from inmate to in-
mate. Only magazines on an approved list may be sent 
in.2 
Of the 375 inmates at the Correctional Center, about 
300 are awaiting disposition of their cases-of which ten 
to fifteen are federal prisoners. The remaining 75 are 
serving state prison sentences of one year or less. This 
proportion of pre-trial detainees is unusually high-other 
correctional centers in the state have a convicted/un-
convicted ratio of about 50/50. 
What follows is a study conducted in 1970 of a 
sample of the pre-trial population of the Correctional 
Center. It considers why and how this sample came to be 
incarcerated, what the conditions of incarceration were, 
what difficulties the sample perceived in dealing with the 
criminal process from behind bars and what effects such 
incarceration seemed to have upon conviction and 
sentencing of jailed defendants. 
(1) A majority of the detained population in the New 
Haven Correctional Center were employed at the time of 
their arrest, and a significant number possessed other 
indices of stability, such as long residence in a local city, 
minor or clean prior record and residence support of 
dependents. Thus, they would make good candidates for 
pre-trial release on non-surety conditions. 
(2) For a sample of defendants represented by the 
Public Defender, the period of pre-trial detention 
averaged six months. Nearly all of these defendants 
eventually pleaded guilty. This six-month detention 
period was slightly longer than the average sentence 
awarded those clients of the Public Defender sentenced 
to the Correctional Center. Nonetheless, pre-trial de-
tainees were denied participation in work or educational 
programs offered to the convicted defendant. The 119 
11 
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year-old Correctional Center lacks funds, is understaffed 
and is unable to provide an effective correctional pro-
gram for its inmates. 
(3) Restraints on the pre-trial detainee seal him off 
from the outside world. This isolation includes, in a 
majority of cases, minimal contact in jail with an attor-
ney. Many detaineees feel that they suffer in relation to 
the bailed defendant in preparation and disposition of 
their cases, and for individuals represented by the Public 
Defender, the probability of sentences to jail or prison is 
approximately three times greater for pre-trial detainees 
than it is for those who are free before case disposition, 
regardless of the seriousness of the offense charged. 
Most of the pre-trial detainees in the Correctional 
Center are being held because they are unable to make 
money bail.3 Bail is an aspect of criminal procedure that 
has had the benefit of extensive examination, both from 
the theoretical standpoint and through massive field 
research: imaginative alternatives to conventional money 
bail have been tested in scores of cities,4 and preventive 
detention is a live issue today and has been supported by 
a wide variety of sources. 5 In determining the adequacy 
and fairness of any system involving pre-trial restraints, 
some kind of balancing process must take place which 
must take into account at least these four factors: 6 





society's interest in not discriminating against 
those unable to meet financial conditions for pre-
trial release, 
society's interest in protecting itself from anti-
social acts by defendants who are not detained, 
and 
society's interest in the fair and efficient operation 
of its criminal justice system. 
Past reports have touched on all four factors from 
varying perspectives. Advocates of maximum freedom 
for defendants have mustered statistical studies showing 
that the threat of recidivism by defendants free on bail is 
minimal and that the rate of non-a.rpearance in no- . 
money bond systems is negligible. Their opponents cite 
statistics to the contrary, especially on the issue of crime 
while on bail.8 The interest of the drafters of the United 
States Constitution in maximum freedom for the in-
dividual awaiting trial has been a topic treated extensive-
ly in scholarly articles, but skirted by the courts.9 
Courts have also refused to hold that detention creates 
substantial prejudice in the preparation of a defense. 10 
Likewise they have been generally silent about the rights 
of the individual detained in jail before trial. 11 
This study describes the interplay of the four factors 
in the Connecticut bail system, especially as it affects 
the plight of those detained at New Haven's Correctional 
Center and levies additional societal costs due to pre-trial 
incarceration. 12 
Bail Setting 
Bail-settinf processes have been abused in many 
jurisdictions. 3 While defense attorneys interviewed in 
New Haven generally felt that local judges make a good 
effort at determining bail impartially, some of the de-
fendants interviewed at the Correctional Center com-
plained that police had used bail as a weapon to punish 
non-cooperation. Literature and pilot programs of the 
past ten years have pointed the way to new and imagina-
tive bail programs which can benefit society without 
creating additional danger to the community or 
impeding the operation of the courts. Connecticut has 
an appointed bench, a progressive legislature and an in-
dependent Bail Commission. Nonetheless, except for 
accused misdemeanants, it has not yet explored some of 
these imaginative alternatives to conventional bail. 
Arrest and Booking 
Normally, bail is set by the police at the station 
where the individual charged is booked. Booking is per-
formed by the arresting officer and the desk sergeant. If 
the court is not in session, the booking sergeant will con-
duct a bail interview of the accused, using an interview 
sheet printed for the Connecticut Bail Commission. (See 
Appendix I) The police take into account factors such as 
ties to the community, prior record and current charges, 
They grant .release on non-money conditions in 60-65% of 
all arrests. 14 The pofice rarely release accused felons on 
non-money conditions. Persons not released are placed 
in the lockup connecting the Detention Center and 
Circuit Court until arraignment when the court is in 
session. If the court is in session, an accused is usually 
sent directly to the judge for arraignment and initial 
bail-setting. ln the New Haven's Sixth Circuit Criminal 
Court, a Bail Commissioner is always on duty when the 
court is in session, and the judge may ask him to inter-
view a previously uninterviewed defendant and make 
release recommendations. 
Bail is normally set at $500-$1000 for minor felonies 
such as breaking and entering or possession of narcotics. 
Sale of narcotics warrants a $5000 bond, and the bond 
for a felony of violence or when an important criminal is 
involved varies widely. 
High bail seems to accompany newspaper publicity. 
Members of a motorcycle gang accused of a well-
publicized mass sex attack on a teenage couple were held 
in jail in lieu .of $75,000 bond on charges of indecent 
assault, while many individuals charged with forcible 3
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rape under unpublicized circumstances had bonds of 
$1000-$5000 set. The current record for bond at the 
New Haven Correctional Center is $250,000, set for a 
young man accused of bombing the Danbury police 
station in the course of a well-publicized bank robbery. 
There may be a rationale for this extraordinarily high 
bail: publicized offenders often have the book thrown at 
them if they are convicted, and knowledge that they 
probably face a long prison term may make them less 
likely to stay within the jurisdiction. 
Bond is also affected by circumstances surrounding 
arrest. Several inmates told the author that the police 
had set a high bond on them because there had been 
name-calling or some scuffling at the arrest. The Chief 
Bail Commissioner for the Sixth Circuit said that this 
does happen but that when it comes to his attention, his 
Commissioners lower the bail to a normal level. Some in-
mates and most of the defense lawyers interviewed 
claimed that the police use the threat of a high bond or 
the promise of a lower one to attempt to get information 
from a subject. Of 87 defendants interviewed, 11 re-
ported the use of bail as a bargaining tool by the police 
or prosecutor. 
Bail Commission 
Under Connecticut statute, all arrested persons who 
are not released on no-money conditions and who are 
unable to post money bond are supposed to be inter-
viewed by a member of the Bail Commission. 1 5 The 
statute requires that if the interviewing police officer 
" ... finds custody to be necessary and such person has 
not posted bail, he shall immediately notify a bail com-
missioner of the Circuit within which such a person was 
arrested who shall promptly conduct such interview and 
investigation as he deems necessary to reach an indepen-
dent decision, and unless such commissioner finds 
custody to be necessary to provide reasonable assurance 
of such person's appearance in court, he shall promptly 
order release of such person on the first of the following 
conditions of release found sufficient to provide such 
assurance: 
(1) upon his execution of a written promise to appear 
(2) upon his execution of a bond without surety in no 
greater amount than necessary, he shall set forth his ' 
reasons therefor, in writing."15a 
[Conn. Gen. Statutes~ 54-63 (c)] 
' 
The Chief Bail Commissioner of the State of Con-
necticut has claimed "spectacular results" for the system 
that implements this statute. He states that the Con-
necticut bail system is superior to projects in other states 
because "In almost all the other projects, numerous 
categories of defendants were eliminated from the pos-
sibility of interview and release. In Connecticut, no such 
categories were put 'off limits' because of a theoretical 
expectation of non-appearance." 16 
The Commissioner admits that the system operates 
differently in practice than in theory: " ... Connecticut 
Bail Commissioners seem to have dealt with bail in the 
time-honored fashion by refusing to grant non-surety 
release to those defendants they considered danger-
ous." 17 It is also admitted that the necessity of working 
cordially with the police and avoiding conflict with 
judges discourages Bail Commissioners from using non-
surety release where the offense carries a possible sen-
tence of more than five years. 18 Investigation for this 
study led to the conclusion that the performance of the 
Connecticut Bail Commission in the New Haven area is 
discouraging and that only limited gains have been made 
by the creation of this statewide agency. 
Some of these gains are: (1) facilitating release of 
most misdemeanants on non-money conditions, (2) 
rendering the bail process in Connecticut more visible, 
and (3) providing the framework for future broader bail 
projects. 
Problems include: (1) the fact that few felons in the 
New Haven area are interviewed by a Bail Commissioner 
despite the statutory mandate, and (2) the fact that the 
Bail Commission has had little effect on the size of the 
Correctional Center's population. 
Bail Commissioners admit that the system is designed 
for misdemeanants and does not provide for interviewing 
felons except in unusual circumstances. 19 Of 85 accused 
felons awaiting trial in the New Haven Correctional 
Center, 75 stated that they had never been interviewed 
by a Bail Commissioner. Of the ten who reported an 
interview with the Commission, three stated that the 
Bail Commissioner raised their bail. A significant number 
of these arrested individuals would qualify for release 
under standards based on community ties. Files of the 
Public Defender of the New Haven Superior Court 
checked in April, 1970 revealed that for 74 individuals 
held for want of bail, no record of a Bail Commission 
interview existed. 
Furthermore, at a meeting on February 25, 1970, the 
Chief Bail Commissioner requested the Warden of the 
New Haven Correctional Center to stop furnishing his 
office with a monthly list of individuals awaiting trial 
who had been incarcerated over two weeks with a bond 
of $500 or less. The Chief Bail Commissioner stated that 
sending his assistants to interview these persons at night 
was a waste of time, since only four of the 52 irtdividuals 
recently interviewed had been recommended for release. 
It was agreed that in the future the Center's Counselor 
would report by telephone any deserving cases that 
came to his attention and that a special interview would 
be arranged. Because of the heavy workload the Counse-
lor carries, this arrangement has effectively eliminated all 
such interviews. 
An official of the Bail Commission indicates that the 
Commission felt that the lists provided them were not 
carefully enough screened and that too much time was 
wasted in interviews at the jail. But even when only four 
of 52 inmates interviewed are found to be good risks for 
non-monetary release, a cost-benefit analysis indicates 
that the interviewing process is a good bargain for the 
13 
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state. It takes 15 minutes to complete one interview and 
make spot verification; this means that 52 interviews 
take 13 hours. Information tabulated in the text, infra, 
indicates that if the four persons had just been incarcer-
ated, they would normally have spent 180 days awaiting 
case disposition, at board expense of $2.85 per day. 
Direct expenses to the state could be cut by slightly over 
$2000 with the release of these four persons, making it 
well worth 13 hours of labor by an Assistant Bail Com-
missioner. Other benefits to the state include the in-
creased rehabilitative quotient of persons so released and 
the savings of public assistance benefits which would 
otherwise be paid to dependents of defendants who 
were working at the time of their arrest. 
In July of 1969, the staff of the Bail Commission was 
cut from sixty-one to twenty-eight and the function of 
initial bail determination was given back to the police.20 
During its year of full-scale operation," ... the Com-
mission [had] achieved an overall non-surety release rate 
of 61 percent of bailable offenses."21 It is claimed that 
this release rate was "striking" in contrast to other bail 
reform projects. However, after the cutback, following a 
dip to the rate of 35% in July-August 1969, the rate of 
release on non-surety conditions for September and 
October of 1969 climbed back to 65% - above the pre-
cutback figure.2 2 
Moreover, if the Bail Commission has truly effected a 
radical change in the bail-setting process, this change 
should be reflected in the numbers of people incarcer-
ated at the New Haven Correctional Center.23 But from 
July, 1967, to July, 1968, the year prior to the Bail 
Commission's inception, the average inmate population 
was· 304; from July, 1968, to July, 1969, containing the 
nine months of full Bail Commission operation, it was 
300; and from July, 1969, to March, 1970, the period of 
truncated (but "effective") Bail Commission operation, 
it was 303.24 It appears that the Bail Commission has 
not made a significant dent in the numbers of individuals 
incarcerated before trial; it has simply shifted the 
method by which misdemeanants who almost always 
would have made money bail are released. While this 
allows the release on non-surety conditions of some 
individuals who would not have been able to make a low 
bond, and also relieves numerous misdemeanants of the 
financial burden of paying a bondsman's fee, it is only a 
small step forward. 
Judicial Functions 
If he has his bail reviewed, or set, the accused is 
booked while court is in session, by a judge of the Sixth 
Circuit Court. At this stage of the proceeding, the signif-
icant actors are the prosecuting attorney, the defendant's 
attorney and the judge. In many cases, only two of these 
figures are active: thirty-five of eighty-six pre-trial de-
tainees interviewed reported that they had no lawyer 
present at their initial court bail-setting. 
The prosecutor recommends bond to the judge. His 
primary consideration is often the danger posed to the 
public by the person charged.25 It is reported that the 
police or prosecutor prefer surety conditions because a 
bondsman will act as a paging service for his client: if it 
is necessary to get an accused into court on short notice, 
the bondsman can provide this service, while the Bail 
Commission cannot. A prosecutor will often lower his 
bail when there are mitigating circumstances surround-
ing the offense or when the defendant has strong com-
munity ties. There is no table listing recommended bail 
amounts for various offenses, but the assistant prosecu-
tors are instructed that in setting bail, their first job is 
"to protect the public". At the local level, it is claimed 
that penalty bonds of overly high amount are not re-
quested, but the Chief Prosecutor of the State admits 
using high bonds to "harass organized criminals." 
Judges at the circuit court level usually follow the 
prosecutor's recommendation. Frequently, this is be-
cause the recommendation is not contested by the defen-
dant's attorney, if there is an attorney.26 When defense 
attorneys do move for lowered bail, they feel that judges 
usually perform their judicial function impartially. 
Defense attorneys interviewed accepted the criterion of 
"public danger" for setting bail. On occasion, a defense 
attorney may request a high bond for an addicted client 
"for his own good"-to enable him to "dry out" and be 
examined for committment under the Drug Dependency 
Act. A few defense attorneys may leave high bail un-
contested for personal reasons-they need the bonds-
man's fee for their retainer or they hope to use the 
promise of lowered bail to coax their fee from the 
defendant.27 
What factors are considered at the bail hearing? The 
offense charged is reported to be the main or only con-
sideration. The prior record of the accused may be re-
viewed. But this is rare because only three judges sit on 
the Sixth Circuit Court and by checking the past record, 
a judge risks disqualifying himself: Roots in the com-
munity may also be examined, but the good background 
of some individuals who are unable to make bail indi-
cates that community ties are not especially important. 
A judge may also occasionally take into account the 
accused's financial resources in setting bail. The "means" 
test can be a two-edged sword. One inmate contended 
that when the judge was informed that he could make 
$2,500 bail, the bond was promptly raised to $15,000. 
Statutory provision is made for speedy appeal to 
higher courts, if bail remains set too high for the defen-
dant. In practice, however, appeal is never taken to the 
Circuit Court and rarely to Superior Court. This is be-
. cause it is difficult to win such an appeal29 and because 
it is often a hollow victory to have bail for an indigent 
defendant reduced from $50,000 to $10,000. 
5
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The Bondsman 
In all stages of the process described above, the in-
dividual with the power to immediately free the defen-
dant is the professional bondsman. As stated by a New 
York Grand Jury investigating bail: 
"In the final analysis the fulfillment of the constitution-
al proscription pertaining to bail reposes with the profes-
sional bail bondsman, since he may refuse to write even 
the smallest bonds. The bondsman may act on whim or 
caprice and his decision is not reversible either in a court 
of law or by an administrative agency. The Supreme 
Court ... cannot require· that a bondsman write a bail 
bond no matter how arbitrary the bondsman's 
refusal. " 30 
According to Connecticut General Statutes § 29-151 
(1969) bondsmen may charge $20 for any bond up to 
$300, 7% of bonds between $300 - $5000 and 5% of 
bonds over $5000. If a client does not show up in court, 
the bondsman has six months to produce him before the 
bond will be forfeited. 31 Much of the bond business in 
New Haven is done by a single individual. In considering 
bond risks, he is primarily concerned with the accused's 
ties to the community or past credit rating. If at all pos-
sible, he will get collateral before posting bail for an 
individual. 32 
. Danger to the community is not at all considered by 
this bondsman. In fact, professional criminals will often 
get preferred treatment if their dealings with the bonds-
man have been satisfactory in the past. Regular clients 
can even arrange payment on the installment plan. As in 
other jurisdictions, bondsmen in New Haven appear to 
be reluctant to come down to the jail to bail out some-
one who is being held on low bond, such as $100 to 
$200.33 One pre-trial detainee remarked in an interview 
that he would have been better off if the judge had not 
lowered his bail from $500 to $100, since the bondsman 
would not make the trip to the Correctional Center to 
bail him out. A few of the 87 accused persons inter-
viewed at the Correctional Center claimed that the 
bondsman demanded fees over the statutory rate, but in 
general the major complaint of pre-trial detainees was 
that promises to come down to bail out the detainee 
were not kept. 
Pre-Trial Detention 
Detainee Profile 
The individual who ends up in the Correctional 
Center has, in theory, been through four screens that 
might have given him his freedom: the police officer 
setting stationhouse bail, the Bail Commissioner, the 
judge, assisted by the prosecuting attorney and defense 
attorney, and the bondsman. Yet, sixty-three per cent of 
a sample of bound-over felons represented by the Public 
Defender were imprisoned for the entire period while 
they awaited trial. 34 
Interviews for this study were conducted face-to-
face in the Counselor's Office of the New Haven Correc-
tional Center. The subject was told by both the Counse-
lor and the interviewer that the interview could in no 
way be used to help the subject with his own bail prob-
lems, and that results would be used only as statistics 
in a report that was under preparation. The interview 
sheet used is reproduced in Appendix II, infra. An effort 
was made to avoid asking questions that suggested 
answers: i.e., inmates were asked "Have the police or 
prosecution offered you any kind of deal?" not "Did the 
police offer to lower your bail if you named an 
accomplice?"35 
Table 1 
Community Ties Of 87 Accused Felons Incarcerated At 
The New Haven Correctional Center 
Current Residence in Connecticut or City 
of Arrest For Over One Year: 
Employed: 
Short or Clean Prior Record: 
Living with Relatives: 
Possessing all Four Factors: 







The figures in Table 1 indicate that nearly one-half of 
those held in jail because of inability to make bond 
w?uld meet Manhattan Bail Project standards for release 
w1t~out surety conditions. But of the twenty individuals 
having all four factors in their favor, seven had bonds set 
of $1,000 or under; of forty-two individuals having three 
of four factors, thirteen had bonds set of $1 000 or 
under. And about two-thirds of those who should be 
viewed favorably on the grounds of ties to the com-
munity had high (over $1,000) bonds set. 
15 
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These high bonds may be set to protect the com-
munity from the danger of repeat offenders. However, a 
check of the offense-category of those forty-two individ-
uals having three favorable factors shows that only six-
teen of them were accused of crimes of violence or in-
volving the sales of narcotics. Moreover, there is at least 
some evidence that the danger of repetition of crimes of 
violence is restricted to only a few classes of offenses. 
In Bail and Summons, Herbert Sturz describes the 
initial concern of the Manhattan Bail Project with the 
danger possibly posed by its parolees. Their interviewing 
process originally excluded persons charged with homi-
cide, forcible rape, felonious assault on a police officer, 
impairing the morals of a minor, carnal abuse and nar-
cotics offenses. Three years after the project started, it 
had expanded its coverage to include all but homicide 
and certain narcotics offenses.37 
It is apparent that of the approximately 300 persons 
currently awaiting trial in the New Haven Correctional 
Center, few have ever been interviewed by a Bail Com-
missioner, and a significant number qualify for release 
under standards based on roots in the community. Inter-
views with several officials of the Bail Commission 
revealed that these officials were not surprised at this 
fact. Felons are not interviewed because it is felt by Bail 
Commission officials either that such individuals are 
automatically unqualified for non-monetary release or 
that it cannot successfully process accused felons with-
out additional funds and personnel. 
Despite the humane efforts of the warden and the 
counselor, and their efficiency in restoring security to a 
facility that was recently inmate-run and subject to fre-
quent turbulence, under-staffing of the Correctional 
Center and the age of the cell blocks make it one of the 
worst correctional institutions in New England.38 * As 
may be expected, such conditions prejudice those who 
await trial at the Correctional Center. 
Problems in Case Preparation 
In other jurisdictions, the disposition of cases has 
been more unfavorable for the pre-trial detainee than for 
the person who is free before trial,39 and this finding 
appears to hold true for those detained in New Haven. 
Although the following information is subjective and 
prone to exaggeration by the inmates interviewed, the 
complaints have been substantiated by the Counselor at 
the Center and the author. Twenty-four per cent of the 
detainees had difficulty in contacting witnesses; 18% 
complained of insufficient contact with their attorneys; 
*[A year ago, the Commissioner of Corrections for 
Connecticut admitted this himself. Now he is defending 
a suit initiated by the New Haven Legal Assistance 
Association alleging violation of numerous constitutional 
rights in the New Haven Correctional Center. -Ed.] 
and 37% claimed that the sole fact of their isolation had 
adversely affected their case. 
The problem of contacting winesses has often been 
mentioned as a major difficulty for a detained defen-
dant.40 It may be a special problem when witnesses 
come from a black neighborhood and are unlikely to 
open up to a white middle-class lawyer or investigator, 
or when the attorney's case-load is so heavy and investi-
gative services so sparse that witnesses cannot be inter-
viewed unless the witness is brought to the lawyer's 
office. 
The complaint of "not enough lawyer contact" was 
surprisingly uncommon (18%), considering the infre-
quency of attorneys' visits. Attorneys candidly admit 
their aversion to jail-house interviews, and this distaste is 
reflected in the statistics on attorney conferences 
revealed in the interviewing process. 
Table 2 
Conferences With Attorneys For Pre-Trial Detainers In-










Number of Visits by 
Detainees Attorney Investigator 
12 0 





4 5 10 
For this group of 49, the median number of days in-
carcerated was 55; the model number of visits by counsel 
was zero. Those who had not been visited by their attor-
ney in jail stated that they would generally see their 
attorney for a few minutes in court before a scheduled 
appearance. 
As for visits by an investigator, the Public Defender 
for the New Haven Superior Court is being assisted 
voluntarily by a Yale law student. The law student is 
able to conduct many of inverviews that would other-
wise not take place. However, the Public Defender of the 
Circuit Court does not have this kind of assistance, and 
there are problems inherent in using an investigator to 
conduct client interviews. The investigator does not 
enjoy protection of the attorney-client privilege, and 
can technically be subpoenaed by the prosecution to 7
et al.: Presumed Guilty
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1971
testify to what is told him by a defendant. An investi-
gator may not have the legal training to ask the follow-
up questions necessary to determine the legal strength of 
the defendant's case. Finally, it is important for an 
attorney to discuss facts with the defendant in order to 
get an appraisal of his client's demeanor, an important 
factor in deciding whether or not to go to trial. 
Fifty-five detainees who were represented by counsel 
were queried as to the type of attorney they would 
prefer. Twenty-seven of the defendants interviewed had 
never seen an attorney or investigator during their in-
carceration. Nine of these had retained attorneys. Three 
individuals had no attorney at the time of interview. Of 
the total of 66 visits made to the 49 defendants, 34 were 
made by private attorneys. Fourteen of the 49 were 
represented by private attorneys. 
Table 3 
Present Attorney Preferred Attorney 
Type No. Type No. % 
Public Defender 29 Private Attorney 19 66 
Public Defender IO 34 
Legal Aid 3 Legal Aid 3 100 
Private Attorney 23 Same 22 96 
Private Attorney 
Different 
Private Attorney 4 
The highest percentage of persons preferring an attorney 
other than their current one was to be found among 
those inmates represented by a Public Defender. This 
feeling exists despite the opinion among court officials 
and local bar members that New Haven Public Defenders 
are able to do a better job for their clients than the 
average criminal lawyer with a far lighter case load. Dis-
satisfaction among the accused may spring from the lack 
of lawyer-client contact when a Public Defender is 
appointed. This seems to be supported by the fact that 
most of those preferring the Public Defender had been 
visited one or more times by an attorney or investigator 
from the Public Defender's office. Inmates may also 
share the natural tendency to regard with suspicion 
something that is given for free when the same com-
modity is also for sale.* 
Problems with attorney-client communications are 
compounded by the near-total isolation that the pre-trial 
detainee finds himself thrown into when he enters the 
*[See Jonathon Casper "Did You Have a Lawyer. ... ", 
this issue - Ed] 
Correctional Center. Isolation was ranked as the number 
one complaint of the survey sample. Forty-three persons 
(nearly half of the sample) complained of either inade-
quate lawyer contact or other problems related to isola-
tion. Many detainees wanted their lawyer to explain the 
options available to them and to evaluate strength of 
their cases. They wanted to be able to personally partici-
pate in bargains struck with prosecutor, to confer with 
co-defendants and to make restitution to, or reason with, 
complaining witnesses and to contact their own 
witnesses. 
The insular quality of an inmate's life is created by 
the circumstance of imprisonment and a number of regu-
lations that sharply limit his contacts with the outside 
world. When a pre-trial detainee enters the Center, he is 
placed in a one-man cell for orientation for the first 
three days. During this period he is unlocked only for 
meals. Generally, on the day he reports in or the follow-
ing day he is taken to the Counselor, who will make one 
phone call for him to whomever he wants. This call and 
any others while he is at the Correctional Center are 
made through the Counselor. No one may speak person-
ally on the phone to anyone on the outside. Following 
the first phone call, further phone calls must be re-
quested by slip and will be made only in important situa-
tions. Phone calls to check case progress or to make 
routine family contact are not permitted, except that an 
individual who is not getting mail or visitors may be 
allowed to make a phone call to check on a family situa-
tion. Phone calls may be made only when the Counselor 
is on duty and the cells are unlocked, generally between 
9:30 and 11 :30 or 1:00 and 3:30. Only one phone and 
one Counselor are available to handle phone calls for 
the population of 375, and this Counselor has many 
duties in addition to relaying phone messages. 
The new inmate will also be given several envelopes; 
he may write only to his attorney and immediate family. 
All incoming mail is checked for contraband, such as 
cash or drugs, and 50-60% of all mail is censored. Visits 
to un-sentenced prisoners are allowed two days a week, 
between 1: 15 p.m. and 3: 15 p.m. They are limited to 
fifteen minutes, although they are sometimes cut to 
seven or eight minutes, and the only visitors allowed are 
members of immediate family. Former inmates may not 
normally visit. If an inmate has no immediate family in 
the New Haven area, arrangements can be made to allow 
one non-family-member to visit. Visitors must stand in a 
row with a group of other visitors at a bar four feet from 
a wire mesh cage and shout their greetings across to the 
inmate. Visitors sometimes wait up to two hours to 
make their brief social calls. Professional people, such as 
lawyers, doctors and ministers, may visit at any time. 
They are allowed to enter the wire cage and talk face to 
face with the detainees at a small table. 
The pre-trial detainee may be under some pressure to 
plea bargain to get out of the Correctional Center and 
into the far more salutory atmosphere of Somers State 
Prison. No law books are available to the inmate. The 
individual who had lost his job is usually unable to retain 
the services of a private attorney. Time in jail may alter 
the defendant's appearance for the worse. One inmate, 
when first seen, appeared to be a young, clean-cut and 
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cheerful country boy. Two weeks later, the same inmate, 
who had spent his past few days in administrative segre-
gation as an escape risk, had acquired an unmistakable 
pallor-"jailhouse grey"-had sunken eyes, trembling 
hands, a few days stubble on his jaw, and had become 
completely withdrawn, sinking his chin onto his chest 
and answering questions in monosyllables only. If he 
goes to trial, he is allowed to wear civilian clothes but is 
led into court by a guard from the lock-up adjoining the 
courtroom. The appearance of the defendant is not 
likely to go unnoticed by a jury. 
It is evident that the accused who is detained before 
trial is substantially prejudiced in seeking favorable case 
disposition, partially by conditions that are correctable 
without eliminating detention altogether and partially 
by conditions that could be effected only by funda-
mental changes in the current system of pre-trial 
detention. 
Societal Costs 
The costs to society of pre-trial detention under op-
pressive and unpleasant conditions are both direct and 
indirecL It is particularly important to study these costs 
in light of current pressure from some quarters to insti-
tute programs of preventive detention. 
Direct costs to society include room and board ex-
penses for each person imprisoned. At the New Haven 
Correctional Center, average costs are estimated to be 
$2.85 per day per inmate, or $1,040 per year per in-
mate.41 Additionally, those people who had jobs and 
were supporting dependents lose their income, and the 
state is required to provide welfare benefits to these 
dependents. Of 79 pre-trial detainees polled, 34 ( 43.1 %) 
reported that they had been supporting dependents. Per-
sons who are able to keep their employment may be able 
to retain a private attorney. If they are jailed and are 
forced to request a Public Defender, another financial 
burden is placed on the state. Fifty-five of 87 accused 
persons interviewed had been employed when they were 
arrested. 
Indirect. costs to society are levied when individuals 
are treated in an unfair fashion. Despite sincere efforts 
on the part of the Warden, Counselor and staff of the 
New Haven Correctional Center, conditions of imprison-
ment for the pre-trial detainee in New Hav~n remain 
deplorable. The individual who awaits trial behind bars 
in New Haven-and in most jails-suffers the worst of 
two worlds: he suffers the loss of freedom that is en-
joyed by those who are able to make bail and he is 
denied many of the benefits and privileges that are 
granted to sentenced persons in the inmate 
community.42 
The problem of the inadequate jail is not confined to 
New Haven: 
"American county jails have been often described as the 
penal (they cannot be called correctional) institutions 
that have most successfully resisted change and reform. 
Most of them have been rated by inspectors as unfit for 
human habitation. Old and unsanitary buildings, poorly 
qualified and constantly changing personnel, interming-
ling of all types of prisoners-sick and well, old and 
young, hardened criminals and petty offenders-in over-
crowded cell-blocks and 'tanks', and the almost com-
plete absence of even the most rudimentary rehabilita-
tive programs constitute a scandalous state of 
affairs .... "43 
A rating of the county jails in one of the nation's most 
progressive and wealthy states resulted in" ... less than 
10 per cent of the county jail systems [receiving] a 
rating of standard, and ... about 60 per cent [receiving] 
a rating of very poor."44 
Physical conditions at the New Haven Center are 
described above. Medical care meets minimal standards 
and some problems of contagion exist. The Warden re-
ported that the court committed an alcoholic to the jail 
because he "had active tuberculosis and should not be 
allowed to go among the general public," and other 
instances of inmates with active TB have been reported. 
Pre-sentenced inmates are not allowed to participate 
·in the limited rehabilitative services of the center. Four 
possible reasons exist for this policy: 
( 1) The presumption of innocence. Those who are 
innocent do not require rehabilitating. 
(2) Transience of the pre-trial population. 
(3) Lack of resources to provide rehabilitative 
services to both convicted and un~onvicted 
inmates. 
( 4) Security considerations. 
. The presumption of innocence should not bar rehabil-
t\tion; this presumption has already been ignored in the 
vdry fact of pre-trial detention. Likewise, transience of 
the pre-trial population should not be a factor in denying 
detainees rehabilitative services. A check of the records 
of 75 individuals detained before trial and represented 
by a Public Defender showed that these individuals 
spent an average time of six months in the Correctional 
Center awaiting disposition of their cases. A sample of 
nineteen persons represented by' a Public Defender and 
sentenced to the Correctional Center showed that they 
received a mean sentence of 5.7 months. 
This suggests that the pre-sentenced population may 
in fact be "serving" more time in the Center than sen-
tenced inmates. Despite this, they cannot take advantage 
of work programs or a school conducted by two teachers 
and a teacher's aide. The pre-sentenced inmate suffers 
even more in comparison with the inmates at Somers 
State Prison, where the plant is modern, educational and 
employment opportunities are varied and complete, and 
the staff/inmate ratio is much higher. 9
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The primary reasons for denying pre-trial detainees 
rehabilitative programs, then, are a lack of resources and 
security problems. The pre-trial detainee is viewed by 
the Center officials with a wary eye. He is likely to be 
accused of a serious crime, while his sentenced counter-
part has been convicted of a relatively minor crime. 
Both the Warden and the Counselor of the Correctional 
Center feel that the unconvicted inmate is psychological-
ly less stable than the convicted inmate, because he lives 
with uncertainty. Lack of a large enough staff frustrates 
any effort to classify the pre-trial population into risk 
categories, and so all detainees are treated as though 
they were maximum security risks. 
The opportunity for inmates to work in the Center is 
limited to the sentenced population and consists wholly 
of maintenance and kitchen labor. The work available 
occupies only about 80% of the current sentenced popu-
lation. It is a coveted privilege, not because of the 
wages-a pack of cigarettes-but because time hangs 
heavily on the inmate's hands. 
Inmates, both convicted and unconvicted, are in 
need of extensive counseling to help them with personal 
problems, provide guidance and effect liason with the 
outside world. The single Counselor at the New Haven 
Correctional Center does a capable job of maintaining 
rapport with the population of the Center and attempt-
ing to help with outside problems. He very much needs 
assistance. The American Cotrectional Association 
recommends that in prisons, where the population may 
be more stable than in a jail, the staff consist of I full. 
time psychiatrist, 3 full-time psychologists and 3 full. 
time counselors for every 600 inmates.45 The lone 
counselor at New Haven is not able to effectively coun· 
sel, or even regularly see, the 375 inmates. His problems 
are exacerbated by the time he must spend making 
phone calls for any inmate wishing to place a call. Be-
cause he is overworked, he must concentrate on major 
problems, and the pre-trial detainee who has a minor 
problem or who just wants to talk things over may be 
ignored. 
An additional consequence of the Counselor's heavy 
workload is that he is unable to do meaningful classifica-
tion work with pre-trial detainees. Because he is unable 
to distinguish the recidivist major offender and trouble-
maker from a first offender, the mass of pre-trial de-
tainees are treated as a homogeneous group. Since in the 
eyes of correctional officers, "the fundamental responsi-
bility of prison management is the secure custody and 
control of prisoners" ,46 all of the pre-trial incarcerated 
are treated as though they provide a maximum threat to 
the security of the Center. 
Disciplinary sanctions that may be meted out, rang~ 
from reprimand to punitive segregation (solitary con-
finement) with loss of privileges (commissary, visiting). 
Punishment may be imposed only by a three-man dis-
ciplinary panel, generally composed of the Warden and 
two of the corrections officers. The accused is present at 
the review of charges, but the complaining officer is not. 
All punitive segregation is reported to and approved per-
functorily by Commissioner of Corrections. Disciplinary 
procedure conforms generally to the guidelines laid 
down by the American Correctional Association. 
Progressive prison administrations segregate the 
population into different types of offenders or accused 
offenders.47 California statutes, for example, separation 
of males from females, juveniles from adults, convicted 
from unconvicted, they also require segregation of 
material witnesses, those incarcerated under civil process 
(non-support) or for contempt, and persons with infec-
tious diseases. The state of California also recognizes a 
moral obligation to segregate the mentally disordered, 
sex deviates and recidivists charged with serious 
crimes.48 In New Haven, due to the physical structure 
of the Center and the lack of time for classification, 
there is virtually no segregation. Some attempt is made 
to separate markedly homosexual individuals from the 
general population. Suspected trouble-makers or escape 
risks are kept in administrative segregation. Long haired 
or bearded prisoners are kept in administrative segrega-
tion until they agree to a shearing or shave, for " sanitary 
reasons." 
In 1936, the Center was criticized because: 
Under the present system there is no segregation of 
prisoners. The young and old, the hardened criminal and 
first offender, the diseased and the healthy, the mentally 
warped and the normal, the drug addicts and the per-
verts are all intermingled indiscriminately together. ... 
One of the worst features of the present system is that 
the tried and the untried are both kept in the same 
institution. Since some of those awaiting trial are 
eventually proved innocent, this is an intolerable and 
grossly injurious procedure which should no longer be 
permitted .... The mental health cases are not segre-
gated and treated unless they are so bad that the in-
dividuals can be sent to the state hospital, which is 
difficult to arrange .49 
This assessment, made 35 years ago, is true word-for. 
word today. The major segregation of inmates in the 
Center is made on the basis of the bond that is set: the 
East Wing (ISO cells) contains persons for whom a bond 
over $15,000 has been set; the West Wing and Annex 
( 150 cells) contain convicted individuals and those held 
under a bond of less than $15 ,000. These groups are 
never allowed to mingle. Absence of separation by type 
means that a 16 year old accused of his first offense is 
thrown in with burnt-out alcoholics, bank-robbers who 
have spent most of their lives locked up, drug addicts, 
the violent and the abnormal. 
The daily living conditions of those detained while 
awaiting trial are more unpleasant than those for bailed 
individuals, and indeed they compare unfavorably to the 
conditions for those sentenced to the State Prison or 
even to the same Correctional Center in which the pre-
trial detainee awaits trial. Until a new facility, more 
funds and an increased staff are provided, it will be true, 
as in I 932, that "little more is possible under present 
conditions and with the present staff than a routine 
process of receiving and discharging again the never-
ending flow of population."50 
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Studies in other jurisdictions have uniformly shown 
that the individual incarcerated before trial suffers in the 
final disposition of his case in comparison to his bailed 
counterpart. Incarceration appears to affect the likeli-
hood of conviction, the likelihood that a prison sentence 
will be imposed and the severity of such sentences.51 
Locally, it was believed by prosecutors that the individu-
al who was jailed while awaiting trial would be treated 
more leniently than the bailed individual and that judges 
would be likely to impose milder sentences on the per-
son already "punished" by a stay in jail. But a study of 
the records of the New Haven Superior Court Public 
Defender indicates that this is not so. 
A total of 153 cases that had proceeded to disposition 
were checked. Information was obtained concerning 
cases taken by the Public Defender for the New Haven 
Superior Court. An approximately equal sample of 
bailed and jailed defendants were selected. All cases 
tabulated below involved persons charged with a felony: 
Table 4 
Bailed Group Jailed Group 
Mean Bond $1680 .$4210* 
Median Bond $1000 $1000 
Mean Time from Arrest 
to disposition 6.8 months 6.0 months 
Suspended Sentences 36(47%) 12 {16%) 
Nolles and Acquittals 10 {13%) 6 (8%) 
Sentences to jail or 
Prison 31 { 40%} 58 {76%} 
Total 77 (100%) 76 (100%) 
*One bond of $75 ,000 was not included in this calcula-
tion to avoid skewing the mean misleadingly. 
This type of data is not itself conclusive on the issue 
of prejudice flowing from pre-trial detention. It may be 
that people are detained before trial because they are 
somehow viewed as "bad" or dangerous by the courts. 
To obtain more accurate results, the sample was broken 
down into cases in which bond was set at $500 and 
$1000. People with identical bonds can be viewed as 
equally "bad" or dangerous in the eyes of the court. The 
only difference is that one group was able to meet raise 
bail and the other was not. All individuals were repre-
sented by the Public Defender. 
Table 5 
Bailed Group 
$500 bond 23 
$1000 bond 16 
Total 39 
Su'Spended Sentences 












2 ( 7%) 
22 (73%} 
30 (100%) 
Table 5 indicates that the percentage of individuals not 
receiving prison sentences is over two times as high for 
the bailed group as for the jailed group. It also appears 
that over three times as many defendants on bail were 
able to achieve dismissal of charges or an acquittal as 
were the defendants from the jailed group. 




$500 or $1000 Bond 
Incarcerated 15 
Median Sentence 8 months 
Mean Sentence 8.6 months 
Jailed Group 




Sentences for both groyps were distributed around 
the same approximate central figure, 8-9 months, but a 
number of long sentences for the pre-trial detained 
group caused the average length of sentences awarded to 
be 7 months longer for the jailed group. It should be 
noted that the above study is almost totally an examina-
tion of the plea-bargaining process. Only four of 153 
cases studied went to trial. The vast majority of the re-
mainder were settled by plea, with a handful being 
nolled by the state's attorney. Statistically, being jailed 
under the most adverse conditions did not seem to 
coerce defendants into plea bargaining any more than 
their bailed counterparts, although it cannot be dis-
counted as a psychological factor and may lead to less 
favorable bargains with the prosecutor. 52 Table 5 does 
seem to confirm the conventional wisdom that pre-trial 
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detention: has a pernicious effect on the defendant at the 
sentencing proceeding. As a Federal District Court Judge 
has remarked: 
"Psychologically, it is easier for a sentencing judge to 
remand a defendant to jail or to sentence him to prison 
than it is to tear him away from his family and com-
munity. This likelihood is heightened by the fact that 
the defendant at liberty pending trial has the opportun-
ity of demonstrating by his conduct that he may be a 
suitable candidate for probation, and he may thus 
persuade the probation officer to submit a more favor-
able presentence report."s 3 
It may be that some of the hidden statistics in this 
study would throw this conclusion into doubt. Possibly 
the defendants in the jailed low bail sample were in fact 
significantly different from their bailed counterparts: 
they may have had longer records, poorer employment 
histories, less binding family ties. But this hypothesis is 
cast into doubt by the results catalogued earlier in this 
paper showing that a large proportion of the pre-trial 
detained population in the New Haven Correctional 
Center does possess characteristics that would make it a 
good probation risk. 
An important aim of any system of justice is to avoid 
penalizing the innocent. Six of the seventy-six persons 
imprisoned while awaiting trial were ultimately acquitted 
or had their cases dismissed. They served a mean time of 
I 07 days in jail. When the number of people receiving 
suspended sentences or sentences equal to time already 
spent in the Correctional Center54 are added to the 
number not convicted, 25 of the 76 persons not making 
bail were released after disposition of their case. The 
mean time served by persons receiving a suspended 
sentence, acquittal or dismissed charges was 4.6 
months.ss 
Conclusion 
Connecticut possesses progressive bail legislation and 
an autonomous Bail Commission but has not yet 
explored tlie full range of release conditions suggested 
by projects elsewhere. The Bail Commissioners in the 
metropolitan New Haven area do not work in the area in 
which the problems are most acute, setting bail for 
identifying good bail risks amon~ def~nda~ts a_ccused of 
felonies.s In New Haven, such 1dent1ficat10n 1s not 
being made, and in spite of legislative requirements, no 
attempt is being made to identify these good risks. A 
preliminary survey of the population of the New Haven 
Correctional Center indicates that many of those 
awaiting trial would be almost certain to appear for trial 
if they were released and would present little threat to 
the community if they were freed prior to the disposi-
tion of their cases. 
Recidivism is currently a rallying cry of those who 
would oppose more lenient bail practices. Statistics on 
the subject are muddied, as indicated by a Washington 
Post story on February 2, 1969, stating that "at least six 
statistical surveys-containing widely varying results-
have been circulated in the current debate over bail."57 
Statistics on recidivism usually use rearrest figures, ig-
noring the facts that arrest does not necessarily lead to 
conviction and that a bailed subject is likely to be 
arrested on suspicion by a police dragnet if a crime is 
committed in his neighborhood.58 If a high recidivism 
rate is assumed, there are still a large number of persons 
being held for want of bail who are not accused of vio-
lent or strongly anti-social offenses and thus do not pose 
a true danger to the community. 
Indiscriminate levying of bail shifts the responsibility 
for deciding the freedom of an individual from the 
courts to the bondsmen. Surety bail is an unsatisfactory 
device for ensuring the return to trial of the individual 
accused. In New Haven, as in most cities, bondsmen 
usually demand full collateral for posting bail for all who 
are not professional criminals. If full collateral is posted, 
the bondsman has no financial stake in ensuring the 
return to court of the accused, for the accused's non-
appearance presents no risk to him. If no collateral is 
posted, the bailee has no financial stake in his own 
appearance. 
Jailing unconvicted persons creates direct mainte-
nance costs for society and renders effective assistance 
of counsel difficult at a crucial stage in the criminal 
process. The interlude between arraignment and trial is, 
" ... perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings ... 
when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and pre-
paration ... [are] vitally important. ... During this 
period defense counsel is retained or assigned, negotia-
tions for dismissal or reduction of charges are carried on, 
indictments are handed down, motion to dismiss, to 
remove, to change venue, and to discover are argued, 
pleas are settled upon, witnesses are interviewed, 
evidence is sought, strategy is planned, and presentence 
b 'tt ,,59 reports may e wn en. 
Attorney contact with the jailed accused is inade-
quate in New Haven. Conditions under which pre-trial 
detainees are incarcerated are harsh and penal rather 
than rehabilitative in nature. Sentencing appears to be 
adversely affected by the fact of incarceration prior to 
case disposition. 
Meaningful bail reform cannot exist if judges aren't 
willing to improve the bail system and to utilize infor-
mation provided to them at the bail hearing. Funds and 
the administrative framework for providing of bail in-
formation already exist. It is essential for the Connecti-
cut Bail Commission to disentangle itself from the time-
consuming work of processing the large number of mis-
demeanants that flood the courts and to direct their 
energies toward the release on non-surety conditions of 
accused felons. Other methods of ensuring maximum 
release on recognizance of misdemeanants exist;60 
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recent statistics indicate that an educated police force, 
monitored by a watchful judiciary, may be able to per-
form this function on its own.61 
Recidivism is of course always a concern when 
broader pre-trial release programs are considered. One 
approach to the question may be to release individuals 
on conditions similar to those imposed upon persons on 
probation. Such conditions range from periodic check-
ins to release in the custody of a facility similar to 
"halfway houses" used to aid the transition of convicts 
from prison to normal community life. The drawback of 
such pcograms is the large allocation of resources neces-
sary to properly administer them. 
Liberal pre-trial release was called for in Connecticut 
in 1932 by the Governor's Commission. Today, with 
overcrowded jails and dockets so crowded that defen-
dants wait an average of six months for their cases to be 
considered, this need is even more pressing. Projects in 
other jurisdictions have been notably successful, using 
flexible release standards for all but those accused of the 
most serious crimes.62 The Congress of the United States 
passed perhaps the most comprehensive bail act in the 
country after deliberations that ran over 1,000 
1
pages in 
two rounds of Senate hearings and one in the House. 
If release on recognizance is not appropriate in all 
cases, consideration should be given to lowered bail or 
alternate bail. Table 8 shows the stated reasons why 87 
persons awaiting trial in the New Haven Correctional 
Center were unable to make baii.63 
Table 8 
Stated Reasons For Inability To Make Bail 
Reason Number % 
Too High 40 46 
No Collateral 23 27 
Parole violator, hold from 
other jurisdiction 8 9 
No time to contact bondsman 5 5 
Bondsman won't post bail 4 5 
Capital crime 2 3 
Unknown 5 5 
Total 87 100 
Of 35 inmates polled who were unable to make bail 
for one reason or another, 18 stated they would have 
been able to post bond of $1,000 or less. A study in 
New York indicates that the point at which most defen-
dants cannot post bail is $2,500.64 The present levels at 
which bail are set were not arrived at in any scientific 
fashion; courts should be willing to experiment with 
grouping their bail figures around a lower median for 
felony defendants. Skip statistics from numerous local-
ities suggest that 
" ... the courts might. . .logically assume that all defen-
dants will return and require rebuttal of the assumption 
by substantial evidence of flight."65 
Over one quarter of the accused felons interviewed 
reported inability to make bail solely because they could 
not raise the collateral called for by bondsmen. These 
persons would be released in many instances if legislation 
were enacted allowing alternate bail, permitting a 10% 
cash deposit on the bail set, with a non-surety promise 
to pay the remainder in case of willful non-appearance. 
This system has been installed in various locales66 and 
has been most successful in Illinois, where it has re-
ceived greatest use; the procedure has significantly in-
creased the number of persons released on bond, and has 
produced fewer forfeitures than conventional surety 
bond.67 Since the system as installed elsewhere provides 
for a 90% refund of all cash deposited after all appear-
ances have been made, a financial incentive to make 
appearances is provided for the bailee, which he would 
not have on a simple no-collateral surety bond with a 
non-refundable bondsman's fee. 
It is important that the Bail Commission be a neutral 
fact-finding agency able to provide the data and recom-
mendations required for an effective recognizance re-
lease program. The chief Bail Commissioner has admitted 
difficulties administering the system because of a staff 
that frequently echoes discredited notions of the func-
tions of bail.68 The Commission needs to be expanded 
to administer a broader bail system. Additional staff 
might consist of law students working part-time, and 
full-time personnel with the same backgrounds as the 
state's probation officers. 
Programs releasing defendants on appropriate condi-
tions would save the state money, increase the rehabilita-
tion potential of individuals so released and, if carefully 
administered, impose a minimal additional tax in the 
form of recidivism or bail-skipping. They would also 
solve the problem of deleterious conditions of pre-trial 
detention, eliminating the prejudices catalogued earlier 
in this study. Release would ameliorate the conditions 
existing for those who must be detained by alleviating 
the severe overcrowding existing in the correctional 
centers of the State. If unconditional release is felt to be 
inappropriate for accused felons who are employed, 
conditional release or some sort of daytime release pro-
gram could be utilized. 
Defendants who are presumed innocent should not 
be allowed to languish in deplorable conditions for long 
periods of time while their final disposition is being 
negotiated in a process they rarely participate in. 
Much of the blame for the long period of pre-trial 
incarceration for accused felons should be laid at the 
doorstep of defense attorneys. 
Section 51-180 of the Connecticut General Statutes 13
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gives any defendant held for want of bail the absolute 
right to a trial within one month of the time of his in-
carceration; defense attorneys never use this statute, 
according to all parties interviewed. The plea of guilty 
frequently takes months even when the defendant wants 
to expedite this plea. Delay by defense attorneys may be 
ascribed partially to tactical plea-bargaining. Failure to 
visit a client does not have a similar justification. 
If defendants continue to be held for many months 
before the outcomes of their cases are determined, they 
should be guaranteed at least minimal contact with their 
attorneys. Courts have not held aid of counsel ineffec-
tive when pre-trial detention has made it difficult to 
locate witnesses but defendants who spend months with-
out ever seeing their attorney a single time (except for 
hurried courtroom conferences) have a sound basis for 
claiming inadequate counsel. 
Public Defenders in New Haven, a group of lawyers 
who are effective for their clients in the negotiations 
that comprise 90% of the criminal process, need addi-
tional manpower. This study revealed that individuals 
incarcerated in the Center who had been interviewed by 
a volunteer law student working for the city Public De-
fender for the Superior Court felt far more fairly 
treated than those who had not been interviewed at all. 
Funds should be provided to support one or more such 
investigators for all Public Defenders carrying a signifi-
cant caseload. 
Isolation was the problem most frequently com, 
plained of by pre-trial detainees. Correctional Center 
officials justify rigid limits on visiting, phone calls and 
correspondence by parading horribles that have resulted 
from more lenient policies in the past. 
Following installation of an open phone one year 
ago, 10 inmates managed an escape. It was never proven 
that the escape was coordinated by phone, but it is 
difficult for the corrections officials to avoid this kind of 
post hoc, ergo propter hoc kind of reasoning. Letters 
have been known to contain heroin beneath the postage 
stamp, and visitors have casually thrown away crumpled 
cigarette packs containing drugs, to be picked up by an 
inmate sweeper. 
To a lawyer, a balancing process may call for jail 
officials to take increased security risks in order to 
afford rights of communication to detainees uncon-
victed by the courts. A correctional official is likely to 
view the balancing process differently when he is ulti-
mately responsible to an electroate that is concerned 
only where there is rioting or an escape. The Warden and 
Counselor in New Haven were willing to improve condi~ 
tions in their institutions, but they demanded improved 
facilities, increased staff and more funds to enable them 
to hold the security line while otherwise improving the 
situation of inmates. 
The restriction existing at the New Haven Correction-
al Center on telephone Galls, can be altered without any 
increase in present staffing. The unconvicted population 
should not all be treated as high-security risks. Maximum 
freedom could be permitted all except those who would 
be classed as dangerous under standards like those out-
lined in some of the current preventive detention 
statutes. The escape of an "undangerous" individual 
would be unlikely to create public concern, and greater 
risks could be taken in the restraint of such persons. 
Such a procedure would require a counseling staff suf-
ficient to carry out classification procedures for in-
coming personnel. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger has said that "to put a 
man behind walls and not to try to change him is to 
deny him his humanity-and ours."69 This statement of 
principle should apply no less forcefully to the pre-trial 
detained than to the convicted, particularly when the 
pre-trial detainee spends, on the average, as much time 
or more behind jail walls as does his convicted counter-
part. Improving the conditions of the New Haven Cor-
rectional Center, a long-standing imperative that may be 
acted on in the near future, will of course be a first step 
to making the lot of the jailed accused more bearable. 
Hand-in-hand with such improvement should go a re-
thinking of conventional approaches to the pre-trial 
detained, and a questioning of the philosophy that bars 
the pre-trial detainee from the educational, employment 
and other rehabilitative opportunities available to the 
convicted inmate. 
Much of the public apathy toward the plight of the 
unbailed defendant probably stems from the common 
view that this group of people is in some sense "bad" 
and thus not deserving of much sympathy. One is re-
minded of the remark of a former British Home Secre-
tary about a man named Gallery, who was hanged for a 
crime he didn't commit: "If Gallery was wrongfully 
convicted, he certainly assisted very much in his own 
conviction by the irregular and improper life he led .. .It 
is something like contributory negligence on his part."70 
It is more important than ever today, when support 
for preventive detention is heard from many quarters, 
that proponents of such measures understand the cost of 
such detention for those ruled unbailable under the pro-
visions of the pertinent statute. The merits or demerits 
of preventive detention are beyond the scope of this 
study, but if such legislation were to be enacted, the 
greatest care must be taken to keep the standards for 
detention precise and narrowly drawn. The ~anger of the 
"false positive" -Harvard Professor Dershowitz's term 
for the individual who is improperly predicted to be a 
poor bail risk-is great, and this study indicates that the 
costs of such detention-financial, legal and moral-are 
far too high to be imposed lightly. 
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Bail Interview Form: Circuit Court, State of Connecticut 
("Confidential-Not Subject to Subpoena [Conn. Statute 
54-63d) ") 
Place of Interview 
Date of Interview 
Time of Interview 
Name; Date of Birth, Sex 
Charge(s) 
Family Ties: Marital Status; Residing w/Spouse; No. of De-
pendents; If Minor, living at home?; Living with? 
Residence; Present Address, how long?, Phone Number, Length 
of Time In Area 
Employment: Present Employer; how long?; If unemployed, 
means of subsistence? 
Discretionary Factors (Student, Housewife, Old Age, Ill 
Health, etc.) 
Refere_nces: Name, Address, Position, Phone, Years Known 
Previous Record; Other Case(s) Pending?; If so, what Court, 
Charge 
Other Remarks 
Defendant released from (Court, Police Station) on Written 
Promise) 
Defendant released from (Court, Police Station) on Non Surety 
Bond of$ ___ _ 
Defendant not released from (Court, Police Station) on Written 
Promise or Non Surety Bond for the following reasons: 
Surety Bond Set At$ ____ _ 
Court Date 
I agree to allow the interviewer to contact the people listed 
above as my reference if he wishes to verify my ties to the com-
munity. (signature of accused), (signature of interviewer) 
Office Use: Disposed of, Rearrest Warrant Issued, Rearrested 
Appendix II 
Interviews Accused Felons in New Haven Correctional Center 
I. Name, address. 
2. Birthdate, birthplace. 
3. Charge. 
4. Years lived in Connecticut: New Haven: latest address. 
5. Person living with (wife, relatives, friend). 
6. Where employed when arrested. Weekly pay. 
7. Property owned, debts outstanding. 
8. Previous arrest record, convictions. 
9. Bail amount; changes in bail. 
I 0. Attempts to raise bail; reason not made; amount that 
could be made. 
11. Offers to reduce bail for deals with police or prosecution. 
12. Contact with bondsmen. Reasons for refusal. 
13. Representation at bail hearing. Other legal efforts to 
reduce bail. 
14. Length of time in Correctional Center. 
15. 
16. 
Number of conferences with lawyer or lawyer's 
representative. 
Interview with Bail Commission. 
17. Support of dependents. 
18. Type of representation; desire for alternative representa-
tion; effect of jailing on securing private attorney. 
19. Difficulties in preparing defense due to incarceration. 
(locating witnesses, etc.). 
20. Unfair treatment from arrest to present. 
Interviewer's Comments. 
Footnotes 
I. Report of the Legislative Commission on Jails - Connecti-
cut (1932) 51 (hereinafter cited as 1932 Report). 
2. The inmate weekly "paper" requested that "Popular 
Mechanics" and "Psychology Today" be added to the approved 
list. The general standard for exclusion of a magazine is that it 
cannot be "pornographic or inflammatory." 
3. The interview process revealed that others are held be-
cause they are parole violators, have "holds" outstanding from 
other states (Conn. Gen. Stats. §§54-170-173), or are charged 
with a capital crime. 
4. Forty-two separate projects are summarized in Institute 
on the Operation of Pretrial Release Projects, Bail and Summons: 
1965 (1966), foldout following 8. 
5. Statement of the Hon. Charles W. Halleck, Judge, District 
of Columbia Court of General Sessions in Hearings on Amend-
ments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966 Before the Subcommittee 
On Constitutional Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, 91 st Congress, 1st Sess. 116 ( 1969) (here-
inafter cited as 1969 Hearings); statement of Harry I. Subin, 
Associate Director of the Vera Institute of Justice, New York, 
N.Y ., id. at 226. 
6. Interests (I) and (2) fall into the "Due Process Model" 
and (3) and (4) into the "Crime Control Model" discussed in 
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1 (1964). 
7. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An 
Interim Report on the use of Pre-trial Parole, 38 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 
82 (1963). Also 1969 Hearings, 35,6. 
8. Recidivism statistics for the District of Columbia were 
included in the Report of the Judicial Council Committee to 
Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of 
Columbia, 1969 Hearings 554. 15
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9. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit on April l, 1970, agreed to a rehearing en bane of 
United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann No. 4 73 (2d Cir., April 
1, 1970), in which a defendant unsuccessfully claimed that a 
thirteen month delay from arrest until trial denied him a speedy 
trial. Briefs amici curiae are being filed by numerous organiza-
tions and the appeal hearing should result in a thorough review 
of the troublesome matter of clogged court dockets. 
10. See Fitts v. United States, 335 F. 2d 1021 (10th Cir. 
1964) (rejecting violation of due process claim based on defen-
dant's incarceration before trial and inability to find witnesses). 
11. McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 
802 (1969); Taylor v. Ciccone, 299 F. Supp. 684 (W .D., Mo. 
1969); see generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A 
Cirtique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Con-
victs, 72 Yale L. J. 506 (1963). 
12. See generally,Mollour, Bail Reform in The Nation's 
Capital (1966). 
13. See Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of 
Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1954);A Study 
of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 693 (1958). 
14. Comment, The Connecticut Bail Commission, 79 Yale 
L. J. 513, 515 (1970) (co-authored by Thomas O'Rourke, Chief 
Bail Commissioner, State of Connecticut) (hereinafter cited as 
Bail Commission). 
15. Pub. Act. No. 826, §54-63(c) [ 1969) Conn. Legis. Serv. 
125 7. The Act has been so interpreted as to block operation of 
the Bail Commission where the suspect has been arrested on a 
bench warrant from Superior Court, Bail Commission 5 22, n. 36. 
15a. Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-63 (C). 
16. Supra, fn. 15 at 518, 520 n. 33. 
18." Id. 521, 523. The Commissioner acknowledged that the 
prosecutor's office prefers surety release to release on recogni-
zance because an uncertain docket may create need to call for a 
court appearance on short notice, and the bail bondsman is 
equipped to produce his client quickly and efficiently. Defense 
attorneys interviewed for this study confirmed this predeliction 
among certain judges and prosecutors for the "babysitting" 
service of the professional bondsman. 
19. Interview with Chief Bail Commissioner, State of Connec-
ticut, December 18, 1969. Some exceptions are made for f~,lony 
charges arising from domestic quarrels, and for youths charged 
with possession of small quantities of marijuana. 
20. Pub. Act No. 826, 54-63 (b) [ 1969]. 
21. Bail Commission 530. 
22. Interview with Chief Bail Commissioner, State of Con-
necticut, December 18, 1969. The commissioner estimated that 
350 of 550 "bail-eligible" cases were released on non-surety 
conditions in each of the moriths of September and October, 
1969. At the time of this writing, no additional statistics were 
available. 
23. In Cook County, Illinois, the introduction of a 10% cash 
deposit alternative to normal bail caused a drop in the yearly jail 
population from 23,225 in the year preceding the innovation to 
20,929 in the year of the new system. For the previous seven 
years, the population had been climbing steadily at an average of 
1,500 per year, Bo·wman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit 
Provision, 1965 U. Ill. L. Forum 35, 40 (1965). 
24. Interview, Business Manager, New Haven Correctional 
Center, April 16, 1970. Figures for earlier years are not avail-
able. A_n ~ccurate evaluation on the positive impact of the Bail 
Comm1ss10n would require scrutiny of records showing the 
?umb~r of total arrests and felony arrests before and after the 
incepllon of the Bail Commission, and the total number of 
persons released before and after its inception. Sta tis tics obtained 









1968 - 3,100 
1969 - 4,684 
These figures may indicate that the Bail Commission is responsi-
ble_for keeping the Correctional Center population constant 
while the arrest figure rises. No total release figures before and 
after the Ball Commission's inception are available. Population 
to_tals of the Center don't show the number of pre-trial de-
tainees in t~e totals; no figures are available, but it is estimated 
by Correcllons officials that the number has risen sharply over 
the past few years. 
25. Interview with Chief Prosecutor, Sixth Circuit Court, 
April 13, 1970. It was stated that the prosecutor's office con-
siders dangerous those who are charged with: sexual crimes, 
crimes involving violence to the person, and sales of narcotics. 
Crimes against property are not viewed as seriously unless the 
accused has a long prior record. 
26. Of 87 persons interviewed at the New Haven Correctional 
Center, 30 reported that their attorneys had made motions to 
have bail lowered. In 20 instances, bail was lowered. Compare 
the percentage of bail lowerings on review in other counties, 
Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts - A Field Study and Report, 
50 Minn. L. Rev. 621, 634 (1966). 
27. Interview with private attorney, April 14, 1970. 
28. Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-63 (g). 
29. See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 
113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1125 (1965), cases collected at 1130 n. 185. 
A typical standard for granting a bail reduction on appeal is that 
the amount set must "shock" the court or be "bey0 nd the 
range within which judgments could rationally differ. .. ", 
Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F. 2d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. 
denied 376 U.S. 965 (1964). 
30. Note: Bail: An Ancient Practice Re-examined, 70 Yale 
L.J. 966, 971 n. 37 (1961) (quoting the Report of the Third 
February 1954 Grand Jury of New York County, New York, to 
Hon. John A. Mullen). 
31. Connecticut General Statutes§ 52-316 (1969). 
32. Bondsman Interview, April 14, 1970. Similar policies 
have been reported in New York City, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693, 
supra n. 19 at 704, and in Baltimore, Chicago and Detroit, Bail, 
supra n. 3 at 26. 
33. The Counselor of the New Haven Correctional Center 
reports that it is frequent for a bondsman to refuse to make the 
trip to the Center to post a bond less than $500. See statement 
of Bruce Beaudin, Director, District of Columbia Bail Agency in 
1969 Hearings 62-63;Bai/, supra n. 3 at 33. 
34. These figures were arrived at from a random sampling of 
119 cases closed out over the past two years. Similar incarcera-
tion rates were reported for Philadelphia, I 02 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1031, supra n. 13 at I 048 (3 of 4 defendants charged with 
serious crimes incarcerated between arrest and bail). 
25 
16
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 1 [1971], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol1/iss4/2
26 
35. Fitch and Reynolds, The Bail Reform Act and Pre-trial 
Detention, printed in 1969 Hearings 663 indicates that for a 
sample of completely verified interviews of the same nature 
compiled here, "the defendants gave extremely accurate 
information." 
36. Manhattan Bail Project, supra n. 8 at 75. The character-
istics tabulated for this study do not duplicate those used in 
VERA, but are quite similar. The "records'' were categorized as 
follows: those with no record other than one or two arrests for 
intoxication or motor vehicle violations were described as having 
a "clean" record; those having no felony convictions and two or 
fewer felony arrests with no more than one felony charge out-
standing were described as having a "short" record; those with 
any felony conviction, more than two felony arrests or two 
felony charges pending were described as having a "serious" 
record. Thses are stringent standards, and yet 52 of the sample 
of 87 had a clean or short record; 16 of those were first of-
fenders. The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §3146 man-
dates judicial officers setting bail to take into account: "The 
nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of 
the evidence against the accused, the accused's family ties, 
employment, financial resources, character and mental condi-
tion, the length of his residence in the community, his record of 
convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings, 
or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court 
proceedings." 63% of those detained claimed employment at 
time of arrest, a result inconsistent with the public's picture of 
the average defendant as a non-productive ne'er-do-well. 
37. Supra, for. 4 at 71. 
38. Interview with the Hon. Ellis McDougal, Commissioner of 
Corrections, State of Connecticut, April 10, 1970. The Con-
necticut Correctional Institution, Somers has a staff of about 
600 to supervise about 1,200 inmates; the New Haven Correc-
tional Center, with a far more unsettled and unhomogeneous 
population of 375, has a staff of about 70. 
39. 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, supra n. 19, at 1052, 1053 
(statistics for Philadelphia); 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 642, supra n. 15, 
at 654 (statistics for New York); I969 Hearings 589 (statistics 
for Washington, D.C.) 
40. 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, supra n. 13, at 725-726. 
41. Interview with Business Manager, New Haven Correctional 
Center, April 16, 1970. Total costs per inmate per day are 
$8.45, or about $3,000 per year per inmate. The Federal govern-
ment pays the state $8.00 per day for each Federal detainee. 
4 2. " ... the most ironic finding in the whole study is the 
revelation that accused persons, whom our law presumes to be 
innocent and who are not to be punished, are confined pending 
trial under conditions that are more oppressive and restrictive 
than those applied to convicted and sentenced felons," Foote, 
Foreward: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 685, 689. 
43. ACA Co"ectional Standards 17. 
44. Adams and Burdman, The County Jails of Calif An 
Evaluation (1957). 
45. ACA, supra, at 424; also Jails of Calif '69. 
46. Conn. State Prison-Objectives and Program-Wethers-
field, Conn. (1959) 4. 
47. ACA Co"ectional Standards 410-413, supra. 
48. Jails of Calif 34 supra n. 56. 
49. I936 Report 14. 
50. 1932 Report 55. 
51. 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. supra n. 19, at 1052. 
I969 Hearings 589 (Washington, D.C.) 
113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, supra n. 10 at 960. 
52. James E. Hewitt, Attorney in Charge, Federal Criminal 
Defense Office, The Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, has 
stated that "Pre-trial custody does ... have a clear coercive 
effect," 1969 Hearings 267. The above statement is not sup-
ported by this study; in both the bailed and jailed groups, only 
two persons elected to press their case to trial. No further 
analysis was attempted. 
5 3. McCree, Proceedings of the Conference on Bail and 
lndigency, 1965 U. Jll. L. Forum 1, 4 (1965). 
54. Credit time is given sentenced persons for time spent in a 
Correctional Center awaiting disposition of their cases, Conn. 
Gen. Stat. §18-98. 
55. A similar result was uncovered in New York, Wald, 
Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study; 
Foreward, 39 N. Y.U.L. Rev. 631, 634 (1964). 
56. Foldout, supra n. 4. This summary of 42 different bail 
projects shows that of the 42 projects, only 5 confine their scope 
to misdemeanors; 11 projects deal with felonies only. 
57. American Enterprise Institute, The Bail Reform Act, An 
Analysis of Proposed Amendments and an Alternative 12 ( 1969). 
58. Figures pointing to an extremely low recidi~ism rate i~ 
various bail projects are collected in Note, Preventive Detentwn 
Before Trial, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1496 (1966). 
59. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
60. Bail and Summons 77-78, supra n. 4. 
61. The Police Department in New Haven thinks well e~ough 
of the non-money release program to recently urge legislation 
permitting stationhouse bail for those 18-21 years old, a group 
ineligible under the current system. 
62. See Manhattan Bail Project, supra n. 7; Bail 65, supra 
(describing projects in Des Moines and St. Lo~is);_1965 U. Jll. 
L. Forum 1, 5, 6, (describing a successful project m the Eas_tern 
District of Mich., minutes from the Canadian border, releasing 
accused bank robbers, narcotics offenders and others accused of 
serious crimes). 
63. For a comparative survey taken in New York City, see 
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693, 709, supra n. 13. 
64. Id. at 708. 
65. Manhattan Bail Project 92, supra n. 7. 
66. I969 Hearings 46 (Washington, D.C.); Bail 78-79 
(Illinois); 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693, 719, supra n. 13 (New York 
City). 
67. Jail Report, Cook County Jail (Unpublished, 1965) 4:2; 
Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 
U. Jll. L. Forum 35, 38 (1965). 
68. Bail Commission 520. 
69. Quoted in The New York Times Magazine 25, April 26, 
1970. 
70. Hale, Hanged in E"or 119 (1961). 
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